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“[E]very unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.”1  Just as author Leo Tolstoy recognized 
in 1878, families have always been complicated. No family is more complicated than when 
issues like addiction, unemployment, or homelessness are involved. When state agencies deem 
families struggling with these issues as “unhappy,” they are pulled into the nexus of the child 
welfare system, where parents and children are separated. Much like the recent “defund the 
police” demands of community activists involved with the Black Lives Matter movement, 
advocates are calling for a “defunding of the child welfare system.”2 More specifically, 
advocates are demanding the reallocation of funding to family preservation services.3  In this 
Paper, I propose a redefining of the obligations of the state in family intervention in order to shift 
the approach to child welfare from a punitive system, which punishes families for being 
complicated, to a cooperative system, which treats imperfect parents as redeemable and 
prioritizes the reunification of families. 
In the first part of this Paper, I will review the legal history of child protection and state 
intervention in the United States and how it has evolved following the passage of the Adoption 
and Safe Families Act (ASFA) of 1997.4 I will highlight the inadequacies of the system by 
examining the mechanics of the timeline for filing a petition to terminate parental rights, which is  
statutorily set by the Act when a child has been in foster care for 15 out of 22 months.5 Referred 
to as the 15/22-months rule, I will explain how the timeline is too short for a parent to address 
 
1 Leo Tolstoy, Anna Karenina 1, Penguin Classics (2004). 
2 Rashawn Ray, What does ‘defund the police’ mean and does it have merit?, Brookings.edu (Jun. 19, 2020), 
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/06/19/what-does-defund-the-police-mean-and-does-it-have-merit/. 
3 For a brief argument for reallocation of funding to support services, see Dorothy Roberts, How the Child Welfare 
System Polices Black Mothers, 15 Scholar & Feminist Online J. 3 (2019). 
4 Pub. L. No. 105-89, 111 Stat. 2115 (1997). 
5 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
2 
 
the problems cited by state agency workers without more vigorous assistance, or “reasonable 
efforts” from the state. 
In the second part of this Paper, I will explain the concept of “reasonable efforts” and how 
state legislatures and courts have defined the term to assess what kind of obligation that places 
on the state. I will show how the low bar set by the current interpretation of “reasonable efforts” 
contributes to a ruling in favor of termination of parental rights. 
In the third part of this Paper, I will discuss the impact of the 15/22-months rule on families 
and parents.  I will shine a light on the issues parents face as they race to complete case plans 
before the state petitions to terminate their parental rights. The easy solution would be to repeal 
or extend the timeline. However, I reject this solution because extension would allow states to 
further impose upon families with no objective in sight. Further, children should not have to 
linger in foster care until a disposition in their case because this causes harm to the child and to 
the integrity of their family. 
In the fourth part of this Paper, I review the current state of federal child welfare funding and 
how the money is being allocated and used by states. I review the present and future mechanisms 
states may use to provide direct assistance to families to prevent family separation. I call for an 
imposition of a greater obligation on states to spend money on what will help parents ameliorate 
issues in the short term, instead of pouring funding into investigation, foster care, and adoption. 
Finally, in the last part of this Paper, I propose that the solution is to turn our focus away 
from “family regulation” to “family support.” Many of the issues leading up to termination of 
parental rights can best be addressed through imposing a higher standard upon the states to 
affirmatively engage in “reasonable efforts” to reunify the family. The standard and definition 
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proposed to replace “reasonable efforts” in this Paper, “conscious efforts,” strikes a balance 
between the financial capabilities of the state and the seriousness of state intervention and its 
effect on the family.  I believe we should reinvest in families by ensuring that the preventative 
services we have in place are not simply “adequate,” but satisfactory. I believe the state is better 
situated to repair the quality of services. I suggest states divert the funds sustaining foster care 
programs into direct financial assistance, effective addiction, mental health, education, and job 
training programs, and overall support services for parents. 
I. History 
As early as 1923, the Supreme Court held that the right to family privacy is a substantive due 
process right protected under the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution.6 
Parents have the right to the “care, custody, and control of their child.”7  The parental right to 
make decisions regarding family and child-rearing is one that the Court has recognized as 
“deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.”8 This parental right is based in the implicit 
right to privacy, which the Court has recognized encompasses certain personal decisions 
individuals may make without unjustified government interference.9 Courts largely do not 
intervene when parents have made decisions on behalf of their child.10 For example, in Troxel, 
the Court reversed a visitation order granted to the grandparents over the objection of a mother 
who ceased visitation between them and her children.11 The Court stated that a judge may not 
 
6 Meyer v. Nebraska , 262 U.S. 390, 399-01 (1923). 
7 Id. See also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000). 
8 Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, , 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977). 
9 Carey v. Population Servs., Intern., 431 U.S. 678, 684 (1977). 
10 Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 825 (2d Cir.1977) (A family has a right “to remain together without the 
coercive interference of the awesome power of the state.”). 
11 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75. 
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substitute their own judgment for that of a parent without a finding of parental unfitness.12 Fit 
parents are presumed to be acting in the best interests of their children.13 
However, the Court has explicitly stated that the rights of a parent are not absolute.14 In 
Prince v. Massachusetts, the Court had to decide whether a child labor law interfered with the 
child and guardian’s free  exercise of religion.15 However, the decision of the Court had far-
reaching implications regarding the rights of parents to their children.16 The Court stated that 
“families are not beyond regulation[…] and the state may restrict [the authority of the parent].”17 
The Court has held that families are subject to state regulation when the child is being abused or 
neglected.18 The Supreme Court in Florida stated that “the right to be a parent carries with it 
important responsibilities to be able for care for one’s children without causing them serious 
harm.”19 The best interest of the child will always prevail when a parent has put the wellbeing of 
the child at risk.20 However, the state may not infringe on parental authority “simply because 
they have not been model parents or have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.”21  
When the state alleges that a parent has abused or neglected their child, the court must 
balance three interests: that of the parent, that of the child, and that of the state.22 The Lassiter 
Court emphasized the importance of the constitutional rights of parents, declaring them “an 
 
12 Id. at 68-69.  
13 Id. at 72-73. 
14 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S 158, 166 (1944). 
15 Id. at 164. 
16 Id. at 160 (Note that the appellant in Prince was the aunt and legal guardian of the child). 
17 Id. at 166. 
18 Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979). 
19 S.M. v. Dep’t of Child. and Fams., 202 So. 3d 769, 778 (Fla . 2016). 
20 Id. 
21 Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982). 
22 Id. at 759-61. 
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interest far more precious than any property interest.”23 Like the parent, the child also has an 
“interest in preserving the parent-child relationship.”24 The state has a compelling government 
interest in the well-being of the child.25 Further, when the state removes a child from their parent, 
the state has an interest in ensuring permanency for the child.26 State intervention in a family 
depends on the level of risk of actual or imminent harm to the child.27 Varying levels of 
intervention include temporary removal of a child from their family and the provision of in-home 
services.28 The Supreme Court of Utah noted that some cases may have few options for 
improving the family, but where there are “less-permanent arrangements” short of termination of 
parental rights, courts should consider them.29 When the issues that led to removal remain 
unresolved, the state may petition for termination of parental rights.30 
 
 
23 Lassiter v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 38 (1981) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting May 
v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533 (1953). See also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (“Parents retain a vital interest in 
preventing the irretrievable destruction of their family life.”). 
24 Troxel, 530 U.S. at 88 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[I]t seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent parents and 
families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have these 
interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in the equation.”); Duchesne, 566 F.2d at 825 (“[T]he 
reciprocal rights of both parent and children [include the interest] of the children in not being dislocated from the 
‘emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily association’ with the parent.”). See also Matter of 
Welfare of A. M. C., 920 N.W.2d 648, 657 (Minn. Ct. App. 2018). 
25 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766. 
26 Id. 
27 James M. Gaudin, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum . Servs., Child neglect: A guide for intervention (Children’s 
Bureau 1993), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/usermanuals/neglect-93/ (Explaining how some families have 
issues that require long-term CPS intervention, whereas others may require short-term intervention, which may 
include “support services such as such as child care, single parent support groups, parenting education, and the CPS 
caseworker's helping relationship.”). 
28 Nat’l Acad. of Sci., Engineering, and Med ., New Directions in Child Abuse and Neglect Research , 176 (Nat’l 
Acad. Press 2014), https://doi.org/10.17226/18331 . (“Children found to be abused or neglected may remain in their 
own home, but those assessed as not being safe in their own home are placed in out -of-home care. Initially, such 
care is almost always considered to be temporary[.]”). 
29 Interest of B.T.B., 472 P.3d 827, 841 (Utah 2020). 
30 For instance, Texas provides that the state may move for termination of parental rights when it proves by clear and 
convincing evidence that the child has been in state custody for nine months a nd a parent has failed to accomplish 
the tasks set forth in the court-ordered case plan so the child may be returned home. TEX. FAM. CODE § 
161.001(b)(1)(O) (West 2019). 
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A. Parental Rights and Termination of Parental Rights Proceedings  
The holding of Prince and subsequent cases provides the legal foundation and justification 
for the existence of the child welfare system. The state, acting in its role as parens patriae, may 
interfere with the rights of parents to their children in order to protect the child from harm.31 
When the issues that prompted removal remain unresolved, the state initiates proceedings against 
the parent in court.32 The dispute becomes one between the parent and the state, where the state 
represents its interests and that of the child.33 
Termination of parental rights is considered an extraordinary remedy, involving the 
severance of the legal relationship between the parent and the child, making the parent a legal 
stranger to their child.34 Termination of parent rights proceedings are the most formal 
proceedings in family court and considered “final and irrevocable.”35 Only 13 states statutorily 
allow a parent to petition for reinstatement of their parental rights.36 The Supreme Court has 
described termination of parental rights proceedings as “working a unique type of deprivation.”37 
This is due to the legal ramifications of a finding against a parent of unfitness, which include, 
 
31 Prince, 321 U.S. at 168. 
32 For an example of a case where the state initiated termination of parental rights proceedings against a parent who 
did not resolve the issues that prompted removal, see, e.g. In re: Welfare of Children of R.W., 678 N.W.2d 49 
(Minn. 2004). 
33 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 761. 
34 Id. at 745. 
35 M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 121 (1982). 
36 Reinstatement of Parental Rights State Statute Summary , National Conference of State Legislatures (Jan. 17, 
2020), https://www.ncsl.org/research/human-services/reinstatement-of-parental-rights-state-statute-sum.aspx (Only 
13 states statutorily provide an option for reinstatement of parental rights following termination -- Alaska, Colorado, 
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, North Carolina, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, and 
Washington). 
37 Lassiter, 452 U.S. at 27. An Ohio appellate court also described termination of parental rights as “the family law 
equivalent of the death penalty in a criminal case.” In re Smith, 601 N.E.2d 45, 55 (Ohio. Ct. App. 1991).  
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among other consequences, automatic termination of parental rights to future children in many 
states.38 
To proceed with termination of parental rights, the state must first show, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the subject parent is unfit.39 There are several grounds for termination 
of parental rights.40 Grounds that appear in state statutes generally fall under a form of physical 
abuse, emotional abuse, or neglect.41  Once the state has established through these proofs that the 
subject parent is unfit, the state must also show that termination of parental rights is in the best 
interest of the child.42 Courts have found that termination of parental rights is in the best interest 
of the child where it is “the least restrictive means of protecting the child .”43 Courts have found 
that termination of parental rights is the least restrictive means of protecting the child where the 
state made a “good faith effort to rehabilitate the parent and reunite the family.”44 In addition to 
satisfying this constitutional framework, states that accept federal monies to aid in funding their 
child welfare system must also comply with federal statutory requirements, the most significant 
of which is ASFA.45 
 
 
38 See, e.g., State ex. rel. State Off. for Servs. to Child. and Fams. v. Chapman, 8 P.3d 243, 247 (Or. 2000) (Court 
affirmed termination of parental rights of mother whose rights to two oldest children were previously terminated); 
State ex. rel. Child. Youth & Fams. Dep’t v. Amy B., 61 P.3d 845, 850 (N.M. Ct. App. 2002) (Court found that 
statute invalidating the parental rights of a parent who had a prior termination of parental rights was valid because 
“there is a real relationship between the past conduct [prior termination] and the current abilities.”) . 
39 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 25. 
40 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum . Servs., Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Grounds for Involuntary Termination of 
Parental Rights: State Statutes (Children’s Bureau 2017), https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/groundtermin.pdf  
41 For examples of state statutory ground for termination of parental rights, see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001 
(WEST 2017) and CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 300 (WEST 2016). 
42 Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 (1978) (quoting Smith v. Org. of Foster Fams., 431 U.S. 816, 862–63 
(1977) (Stewart, J., concurring in judgment)). 
43 K.D. v. Dep't of Child. & Fams., 242 So.3d 522, 523 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2018) (whether termination is the “least 
restrictive means of protecting the child”). See also New Jersey Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. E.P., 952 A.2d 436, 
447 (2008) (whether termination “will not do more harm than good to the child”). 
44  A.F. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 276 So.3d 61, 65 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2019). 
45 For requirements states must meet to receive federal funding, 42 U.S.C. § 671 (2019). 
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B. Circumstances Leading to State Intervention 
It is a commonly held assumption that child welfare cases overwhelmingly comprise 
physical abuse. However, physical abuse only accounted for 13% of all child maltreatment cases 
in the United States in 2018.46  Meanwhile, neglect accounted for 64% of all child maltreatment 
cases.47  Advocates characterize most cases as “poverty alone” cases, meaning that the child is 
removed due to a lack of adequate food, shelter or clothing resulting from the parent’s economic 
need.48  Poverty is often treated as the result of individual choices and not a by-product of a 
capitalistic system.49 Unsurprisingly, most of the families involved in the child welfare system 
suffer from poverty.50 The high representation of impoverished families within the child welfare 
system can be attributed to their increased likelihood of contact with entities that  require 
mandatory reporting, such as public schools, emergency rooms, and some homeless shelters.51  
The relationship between poverty and race in the child welfare system cannot be 
overlooked, since a disproportionate number of families represented are Black and Brown.52  As 
of 2019, Black children make up thirty-three percent of the children in foster care, despite 
accounting for only fifteen percent of the child population in the United States.53 African 
 
46 Kathleen Creamer, The Importance of Family Bonds and Kinship Care , Juv. L. Ctr. (Sep. 10, 2020) 
https://jlc.org/news/investing-youth-and-families-importance-family-bonds-and-kinship-care-blog-series-national. 
47 Id. 
48 Naomi R. Cahn, Children's Interests in A Familial Context: Poverty, Foster Care, and Adoption , 60 Ohio St. L.J. 
1189, 1198-99 (1999). 
49 Shervin Assari, Why poverty is not a personal choice, but a reflection of society , The Conversation (Jun. 30, 2017 
5:10PM), https://theconversation.com/why-poverty-is-not-a-personal-choice-but-a-reflection-of-society-79552, Pam 
Fesser, Housing Secretary Ben Carson Says Poverty Is A 'State Of Mind', NPR (May 25, 2017 3:50PM), 
https://www.npr.org/2017/05/25/530068988/ben-carson-says-poverty-is-a-state-of-mind. 
50 Dorothy E. Roberts, Child Welfare and Civil Rights, 585 Fac. Scholarship at Penn Law 171, 175 (2003). 
51 Annette R. Appell, Protecting Children or Punishing Mothers: Gender, Race, and Class in the Child Protection 
System an Essay, 48 S.C. L. Rev. 577, 584 (1997) (Poor families are more susceptible to state intervention because  
they lack power and resources and because they are more directly involved with governmental agencies.). See also 
Marsha Garrison, Why Terminate Parental Rights? , 35 Stan. L. Rev. 423, 433 (1983). 
52 Roberts, supra note 50, at 175. 




American parents are more likely to have their parental rights terminated than white parents.54  
Native American children are also disproportionately represented in the child welfare system.55  
Black and Hispanic children also face high poverty rates.56 In 2019, twenty-five percent of Black 
children and twenty percent of Hispanic children under the age of eighteen lived below the 
poverty level.57  
By and large, substance abuse has overtaken the child welfare system, becoming the most 
cited problem and underlying contributor to other cited problems, primarily parental neglect.58 In 
1999, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) found that almost two-thirds of 
substantiated cases of maltreatment involved substance abuse.59 Unfortunately, the number of 
cases has only increased in recent years. The Adoption and Foster Care Reporting System annual 
report found that the rate of children entering foster care due to substance abuse increased by five 
percent from 2016 to 2017.60 Out of 268,212 children, over 96,000 –one in three—children 
entered foster care due to substance abuse.61 In Knoxville County, Tennessee, Juvenile Court 
judge Honorable Tim Irwin noted that “[termination of parental rights] cases [involving opiates] 
 
54 Christopher Wildeman et. al., The Cumulative Prevalence of Termination of Parental Rights for U.S. Children, 
2000–2016, 25 Child Maltreatment 32-42 (2019) (Study found that African American children are 2.4 times more 
likely than White children to experience the termination of parental rights.). 
55 Disproportionality, supra note 53. The termination of parental rights of American Indian children is dealt with 
under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. § 1912, which is beyond the scope of this Paper. 
56 Valerie Wilson, Racial disparities in income and poverty remain largely unchanged amid strong income growth 
in 2019, Econ. Pol. Inst. (Sep. 16, 2020, 10:49AM), https://www.epi.org/blog/racial-disparities-in-income-and-
poverty-remain-largely-unchanged-amid-strong-income-growth-in-2019/. 
57 Id.  
58 Parental Substance Abuse and Child Welfare, Kempe.org (Nov. 20, 2019), http://www.kempe.org/parental-
substance-use-and-child-welfare/ (Citing that 1 in 8 children lived in homes with at least one parent dependent on 
alcohol or drugs from 2009 to 2014); Kristin Sepulveda & Sarah C. Williams, , Child Trends (Feb. 26, 2019), 
https://www.childtrends.org/blog/one-in-three-children-entered-foster-care-in-fy-2017-because-of-parental-drug-
abuse. 
59 Theodore J. Stein, The Adoption and Safe Families Act: How Congress Overlooks Available Data and Ignores 
Systemic Obstacles in Its Pursuit of Political Goals, 25 Child. & Youth Servs. Rev. 669, 678 (2003). 




used to take several hours in court. Now they take a matter of minutes. I just look at the medical 
records and the case goes by pretty quickly.”62   
C. The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 
When children are removed from the home, they are often placed in foster care when 
kinship placement is unavailable. In 1990, 400,000 children had entered the foster care system in 
the United States.63 The focus of the child welfare system at the time was on reunification of the 
child with their birth family.64  However, following a few high-profile cases across the nation 
involving the death or grievous bodily injury of children who were returned to their families by 
state child welfare agencies, Congress became concerned and passed legislation that erred on the 
side of caution.65 With their concern came the iteration of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 
1997 (ASFA).66 President Bill Clinton signed the legislation into law with overwhelming 
bipartisan support.67 The driving force of AFSA was to change the focus of child welfare from 
family reunification to “permanency,” and to reduce the number of children in the foster care 
system.68 One drafter of ASFA,  Richard Gelles, the Dean of the School of Social Work at the 
University of Pennsylvania, stated that “we are going to terminate parental rights that in the past 
 
62 Anita Wadhwani, Tennessee parents lose kids as opioid crisis rages on , Tennessean (Nov. 26, 2016, 10:02PM), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/investigations/2016/11/26/nas-loss-parental-rights/94231538/. 
63 Child Trends, Foster Care (May 24, 2018), https://www.childtrends.org/indicators/foster-care. 
64 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum.Servs., Child Welfare Information Gateway, Concept and History of Permanency in 
U.S. Child Welfare, https://www.childwelfare.gov/topics/permanency/overview/history/ (last visited on Jan. 13, 
2021). 
65 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking regarding ASFA, 63 F.R. 50057, 50073 (1998). In particular, many children in 
New York City died in the 1990s after being returned to their parents. One famous case was that of six -year-old 
Elisia Izquierdo, who was murdered by her mother after being returned to her care despite a previous removal by the 
city agency. The public outcry following the murder of Elisia prompted New York City to upend its child welfare 
services. Charlie Leduff, Woman Sentenced in Daughter’s Death , N.Y. Times (Aug. 1, 1996), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/08/01/nyregion/woman-sentenced-in-daughter-s-death.html. 
66 Chereese M. Phillips & Aaron Mann, Historical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997 , 23 J. 
Hum. Behav. in the Soc. Environ. 862 (2013). 
67 Id. at 865. 
68 Id. at 866. 
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we would not have terminated…[and] remove children from the home in the past we would not 
have.”69 According to Gelles, “that was the price-tag for the safety of the child.”70 Another 
drafter of ASFA, Dr. Cassie Bevan, who was an advisor for Congressional members and their 
staffs, also expressed concern for children “languishing” in foster care.71 She stated that she was 
concerned “with the sense of time of the child” as they waited for a disposition in their case.72 In 
hearings discussing the Act, legislators echoed concerns that children were being returned to 
“harmful families” and pitted the interests of the child and the parent as adversarial.73 A leading 
sponsor of ASFA, Rhode Island Republican Senator John H. Chafee, proclaimed “we will not 
continue the current system of always putting the needs and rights of the biological parents 
first.”74 Senator Chafee proclaimed that “some families simply cannot and  should not be kept 
together.”75 
In passing ASFA, Congress made its intent clear by stating that “the child’s health and 
safety shall be the paramount concern.”76 ASFA places permanency above family reunification, 
making adoption the primary option.77 For example, ASFA requires state agencies to engage in 
concurrent planning, exploring adoptive or other alternate permanency options while reasonable 
efforts towards reunification are ongoing.78 In fact, ASFA increased the money provided to states 
 
69 Kim Phagan-Hansel, One Million Adoptions Later: Adoption and Safe Families Act at 20, The Imprint (Nov. 28, 
2018), https://imprintnews.org/adoption/one-million-adoptions-later-adoption-safe-families-act-at-20/32582 . See 
also Libby S. Adler, The Meanings of Permanence: A Critical Analysis of the Adoption and Safe Families Act of 





74 Katharine Seelye, Clinton to Approve Sweeping Shift in Adoption , N.Y. Times (Nov. 17, 1997), 
https://www.nytimes.com/1997/11/17/us/clinton-to-approve-sweeping-shift-in-adoption.html. 
75 Id. 
76 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(A). 
77 In re James G., 943 A.2d 53, 74 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2008) (“Generally, [ASFA] is designed to promote the 
adoption of children in foster care.”). 
78 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E)(iii).  See also Jim Moye, It's A Hard Knock Life: Does the Adoption and Safe Families Act 
of 1997 Adequately Address Problems in the Child Welfare System? , 39 Harv. J. on Legis. 375, 381 (2002). 
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per foster child adopted beyond the expected base level, from $2,000 to $4,000.79 As well-
intentioned as ASFA was, critics argue that the intent of Congress was not realized because 
ASFA forces state agencies to err on the side of caution and remove the child without adequately 
addressing the specific needs of the family.80 
Under ASFA, state agencies must initiate a case plan when they place removed children 
in foster care.81 A case plan (also referred to as a service plan) is a written document that details 
the plan for assuring the child is properly cared for and facilitates either the reunification of the 
child with their family or the permanent placement of the child elsewhere.82 For reunification, 
the service plan should be tailored to the specific needs of each family.83 Within the service plan, 
the state agency details the issues that warranted state intervention.84 State agencies often cite 
issues in service plans that tend to be associated with poverty. Some commonly cited issues in 
service plans include inadequate housing (referred to as environmental neglect), substance abuse, 
and parenting issues (such as inadequate care of an infant and inappropriate discipline).85 The 
service plan also includes recommendations on how to fix cited issues.86 The recommendations 
are often carried out through the implementation of services. ASFA defines services as “time-
limited reunification services.”87 These services may include mental health services and 
 
79 David J. Herring, The Adoption and Safe Families Act – Hope and Its Subversion, 34 Fam. Law Quarterly 329, 
340 (2000)(arguing that increased adoption payments would not lead to more adoptions and should be used by states 
for family reunification services.). 
80 Phillips, supra note 56, at 866 (In 1997, U.S. Representative Patsy Mink was the only congressperson who 
testified directly against ASFA, where she stated the government was “overstepping its bounds” and despite the 
intent of the government, the legislation “unfairly penalized the poor for not addressing the underlying problems of 
poverty and child maltreatment.”). 
81 42 U.S.C § 671(a)(16).  
82 42 U.S.C. 675(a)(1)(B). 
83 U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum . Servs., Child Welfare Info. Gateway, Reunification: Bringing your children home 
from foster care (Children’s Bureau 2016). 
84 Id. 
85 Cahn, supra note 48, at 1196. See also Daan Braveman & Sarah Ramsey, When Welfare Ends: Removing 
Children from the Home for Poverty Alone, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 447, 461 (1997). 
86 Reunification, supra note 83. 
87 42 U.S.C. § 629. 
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counseling, substance abuse treatment, and assistance finding adequate housing and 
employment.88 However, ASFA imposes a timeline on how long the service plan may be 
implemented before termination proceedings must be brought.89 Due to this timeline, services 
may not be enough to help parents remedy cited problems.90 
One of the most controversial sections of ASFA enshrined in 42 U.S.C. § 675(E), is 
known as the 15/22-months rule.91 The rule requires states which receive federal funding for 
child welfare services to initiate or join proceedings to terminate parental rights for children who 
have been in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 months.92 There are three exceptions to the 
rule. A state may not initiate termination of parental rights proceedings when: (i) the child is 
living with kinship relatives; (ii) the agency provides a compelling reason why termination of 
parental rights is not in the best interest of the child; or  (iii) the state has failed to provide 
services for reunification.93 The third exception, which will be the focal point of this Paper, 
concerns the failure of the state to provide services for reunification or engage in “reasonable 
efforts” to keep the family together before termination of parental rights.94 
Whereas ASFA only requires the state to file a petition to terminate parental rights, many 
states have adopted the 15/22-months rule as an independent grounds for termination of parental 
rights.95 Parents have successfully challenged the constitutionality of the 15/22-months rule as an 
 
88 Reunification, supra note 83. 
89 42 U.S.C. § 675(5)(E). 
90 Will L. Crossley, Defining Reasonable Efforts: Demystifying the State's Burden Under Federal Child Protection 
Legislation, 12 B.U. Pub. Int. L.J. 259, 263 (2003) (Arguing that the timeline under ASFA for reasonable efforts is 
too short to provide quality services, many of which require more time than the legislation permits.). 




95 For statutes where the 15/22-months rule is a grounds for termination, ALA. CODE § 12-15-317(1)(A) 
(2021);ALASKA STAT. § 47.10.088(D)(1) (2020); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-533(5)(C) (2021);  CONN. GEN. STAT. § 
17A-111A(A) (2021);  IOWA CODE ANN. § 233.111 (2)(A)(1) (2021);  MINN. STAT. ANN. § 260C.301(4) (WEST 
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independent grounds for termination of parental rights.96 In 2001, the Illinois Supreme Court 
held the 15/22-months rule as a grounds for termination was unconstitutional.97 The state statute 
allowed a child to be adjudicated neglected for being in foster care for 15 of the most recent 22 
months.98 The State asserted that the statute served two compelling interests: (1) ensuring the 
safety and welfare of children and (2) achieving permanency by limiting the time a child spends 
in foster care.99  
The Illinois court found the statute was unconstitutional because it was not narrowly tailored 
to serve the compelling interests advanced by the state.100 The court found the 15/22-months 
grounds for termination of parental rights allowed the state to prove a parent was unfit without 
any reference to parental conduct.101 The court noted while other grounds, such as addiction, had 
a time frame tied to the conduct of the parent, the 15/22-months grounds did not.102 The court 
found that many cases existed where the length of time a child spent in foster care was due to 
circumstances beyond the control of the parent.103 As to the specific case before it, the court 
found that nine of the 15 months included in the petition by the state were “directly attributable 
to continuances and court delays” which were unrelated to the question of whether the subject -
parent had satisfactorily complied with reunification efforts.104 As a result, the Court held the 
 
2019);  N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-4-29(G) (2021);  S.C. CODE. ANN.  63-7-2570(8) (2021);  WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-2-
309(A)(V) (2020). 
96 In re H.G., 757 N.E.2d 864 (Ill. 2001). 
97 Id. at 874. 
98 Id. at 868, 870. See also 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 50/1(D)(M-1) (WEST 1998). 
99 Id. at 871, 874.  
100 Id. at 874. 
101 Id. at 873.  
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. at 872. 
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15/22-months grounds unconstitutional because the rights of a parent to their child would be 
terminated due to no fault of their own.105 
II. Reasonable Efforts 
Generally, a state agency should make a “reasonable effort” to ensure that services are 
provided as the parent works to satisfactorily comply with the service plan for reunification.106 
“Reasonable efforts” towards the goal of reunification include services provided to the parent 
and child aimed at resolving the issues that prompted the initial removal, such as referrals to 
substance abuse treatment and parenting classes.107 The term “reasonable efforts” is not defined 
within the AFSA or any other federal law. In its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, DHHS 
addressed the lack of a definition for “reasonable efforts.”108 In effect, DHHS stated that 
providing a definition would remove the flexibility and discretion of the case-by-case analysis 
engaged in by courts.109 Further, DHHS reasoned that since family law is the province of state 
courts, a federal definition would impose on state sovereignty.110 Instead of a definition, DHHS 
provided open questions courts could utilize as guides to reach their decisions.111 The questions 
 
105 Id. at 874. 
106 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21; see also Moira M. v. State Dep’t of Health & Soc. Serv., Office of Children's Serv., 370 
P.3d 595, 601 (Alaska 2016) (Court explained that reasonable efforts includes identifying and actively offering 
support services that will assist parents in addressing the conduct and conditions that caused state interventio n). 
107 For example, the state child protection agency in New Jersey provides that “services include counseling, 
parenting skills classes, substance abuse treatment, in-home services, foster care and residential placement.” Child 
Protection and Permanency, State of New Jersey Department of Children and Families, 
https://www.nj.gov/dcf/about/divisions/dcpp/#:~:text=Services%20include%20counseling%2C%20parenting%20ski
lls,foster%20care%20and%20residential%20placement. (last visited Apr. 1, 2021). 
108 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 65.  
109 Id. 
110 Id. See also U.S. v. Windsor, 50 U.S. 744, 767 (2013) (“[T]he Federal Government, through our history, has 
deferred to state-law policy decisions with respect to domestic relations.”). 
111 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, supra note 65. 
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include ensuring the service plan is individualized to each family and whether limitations exist as 
to service availability.112   
Despite the inclusion of “reasonable efforts” within the text of ASFA, the law does not 
affirmatively require the states to engage in reasonable efforts to reunify families.113 Section 15 
of 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)  provides that the state should engage in reasonable efforts to prevent the 
removal of the child from the home and, if removed, to ensure the child can be returned safely.114 
However, ASFA only provides for circumstances where states are excused from engaging in 
reasonable efforts to provide reunification services.115 One of the circumstances is when a court 
has determined that continued reasonable efforts are futile and inconsistent with the permanency 
plan the State has created for the child.116  In practice, because the State is required to engage in 
concurrent planning for permanency and adoption is the primary consideration under ASFA, 
15(C) requires the state to devote most of its “reasonable efforts” to placing the child elsewhere. 
This implies that a state must start “reasonable efforts” towards reunification with the parent, but 
is under no affirmative obligation to continue when reunification efforts conflict with their 
permanency plan.  
A. Reasonable Efforts According to State Statutes  
Without a uniform federal definition, states that have adopted ASFA have taken different 
stances on what standard governs “reasonable efforts” when determining whether state agencies 
 
112 Id. 
113 Patricia E. Allard & Lynn D. Lu, State Obligations to Children in Foster Case and Their Incarcerated Parents , 
Brennan Ctr. Just.13-14, N.Y.U. (2006), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/d/download_file_37203.pdf. 
114 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(B). 
115 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(D). 
116 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(15)(C). 
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sufficiently engaged in reunification efforts.117 States like New York, South Dakota and 
Colorado have strong “reasonable efforts” statutes.118 In New York, “reasonable efforts” requires 
state agencies to make “diligent efforts” to help parents, including providing them with services 
and assistance that address the primary issues that led to state intervention in the family.119 In 
Arkansas, “reasonable efforts” requires state agencies to utilize all available services to preserve 
the family, which may include cash assistance, transportation, and family therapy.120  In contrast, 
states like Georgia, Connecticut, and New Hampshire have not defined the term as robustly in 
their state statutes. In Georgia, it is indistinctly defined as “due diligence and the provision of 
appropriate services.”121 Whereas Georgia provides a cursory definition, Connecticut and New 
Hampshire instruct courts to define what reasonable efforts means. In Connecticut, the statute 
does not provide a separate definition and instead instructs courts to determine whether the state 
“made reasonable efforts” to keep the child with their family and “if such efforts were not made, 
whether such reasonable efforts were not possible.”122 In New Hampshire, the statute refers to 
“reasonable efforts” in subjective terms, instructing courts to determine whether “services […] 




117 Kathleen S. Bean, Reasonable Efforts: What State Courts Think, 36 U. Tol. L. Rev. 321, 329 (2005). 
118 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19-1-103(89) (WEST 2020) (“reasonable efforts” includes determining whether it is 
appropriate to provide, purchase, or develop the services required to prevent unnecessary out -of-home placement); 
N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-B(7)(F) (MCKINNEY 2020); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-8A-21 (WEST 2020) 
(“reasonable efforts” means the provision by [the state] of any services or assistance that are available or could be 
made available without undue financial burden on the department). 
119 N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAW § 384-B(7)(F) (MCKINNEY 2020) (Note that the statute excludes incarcerated parents 
from services.). 
120 ARK. CODE. ANN. § 9-27-303 (2019). 
121 GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-2 (WEST 2020). 
122 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-129 (WEST 2018). 
123 N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:24-A(III)(C) (2020). 
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B. Reasonable Efforts According to Courts 
In termination of parental rights cases, “courts possess an unusual level of discretion,” 
which makes decisions “particularly vulnerable to subjective judgments based on cultural or 
class bias.”124 In cases where parents argue the state agency did not engage in reasonable efforts, 
the decision of the court is usually dispositive in termination of parental rights.125 Courts have 
also interpreted the meaning of “reasonable efforts” in several states. Without a robust statutory 
definition in Connecticut, courts have interpreted “reasonable efforts” to mean a state agency 
must do “everything reasonable, not everything possible.”126 The Utah Court of Appeals has 
defined “reasonable efforts” as a “fair and serious attempt [by the state] to reunify a child with a 
parent.”127 In Maryland, courts have interpreted “reasonable efforts” in accordance with their 
state statute as “efforts that are reasonably likely to achieve” the prevention of the child from 
being removed from home or finalizing the permanency plan and meeting the needs of the 
child.128 
Courts tend to rule in favor of state agencies in termination of parental rights cases.129 
The reasoning for courts reflects the prioritization of the best interest of the child over family 
reunification as required by ASFA, and assumes that the best interests of the child is a quick 
resolution.130 These cases are often twofold.131 First, the scenario is a “double edged sword” 
 
124 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 762-63. 
125 See 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(d) (Judicial determinations must be “explicitly documented and must be made on a case-
by-case basis and so stated in court order.”). See also Bean, supra note 117, at 332. 
126 In re Corey C., 232 A.3d 1237, 1252 (Conn. App. Ct. 2020); In re Sole S., 986 A.2d 351, 355 (Conn. App. Ct. 
2010); In re Daniel C., 776 A.2d 487, 503 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001). 
127 State ex. rel. A.C., 97 P.3d 706, 711-12 (Utah Ct. App. 2004). 
128 James G., 943 A.2d at 75. 
129 Bean, supra note 117. 
130 Interest of L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019) (“[R]easonable efforts prioritizes the best interest of the child 
over reunification of the family.”). 
131 Bean, supra note 117, at 332. 
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since the state both provides reunification services to the family and plans alternate permanency 
options for the child, essentially acting as both the rehabilitator and prosecutor in termination of 
parental rights cases.132 Second, courts are also faced with a dual reality, where they must 
account for both the financial and qualitative limitations on the services provided by state 
agencies and inability of parents to take advantage of said services to cure serious deficiencies 
within the statutory time period.133 
It is important to note that most cases deciding whether the state engaged in reasonable 
efforts are appellate decisions. With trial courts being granted discretion to determine whether a 
state has engaged in reasonable efforts, the only hope for parents whose rights have been 
terminated is to appeal the decision. Generally, the standard of review in termination of parental 
rights cases is clear error.134 Appellate courts will defer to the factual findings of the trial court if 
a reasonable trier of fact would have reached the same conclusion based on the evidence.135 For 
instance, a Florida appellate court stated that although the determination that the mother failed to 
comply with her case plan was “questionable,” it would not disturb the findings of the trial court 
because they are “clothed with the presumption of correctness.”136 The standard of review leaves 
parents with little recourse when they are challenging the efforts of the state to reunify because 
an appellate court will not find clear error unless the decision is “against the weight of the 
 
132 Santosky, 455 U.S. at 763. 
133 Bean, supra note 116, at 332. 
134 Knuckles v.  Dep’t of Hum. Servs., 469 S.W.3d 377, 379 (Ark. Ct. App. 2015) (“The appellate inquiry is whether 
the trial court’s finding that the disputed fact was proven by clear and convincing evidence is clearly erroneous.”); In 
re D.M., 784 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
135 In re Daniel N., 134 A.3d 624, 628 (Conn. App. Ct. 2016) (When reviewing the factual findings “every 
reasonable presumption is made in favor” of the ruling of the trial court.); Walker v.  Dep’t of Fam. and Prot. Servs., 
312 S.W.3d 608, 615 (Tex. App. 2009) (“To give appropriate deference to the factfinder's conclusions, [the court] 
must assume that the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a  reasonable factfinder could have 
done so.”). 
136 L.B. v. Dep’t of Child. and Fams., 835 So.2d 1189, 1195 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2002). 
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evidence.”137 In turn, the parent must wait until long after their parental rights have been 
terminated to show that the trial court made a clear error and this error resulted in an order for 
termination of parental rights that was not in the best interest of the child.138 Unless the parent 
obtains a stay of the trial court’s judgment of termination, this means that the parent will have no 
visitation pending the appeal, further eroding the parent’s relationship with the child.139 
Courts have found that termination was not in the best interest of the child where the 
actions of the state agency contributed to the termination of parental rights because they did not 
engage in reasonable efforts to provide reunification services.140 In In re James G., the Court of 
Special Appeals in Maryland reversed the termination of the parental rights of the father after 
finding the state did not make reasonable efforts to reunify him and his child.141 The Department 
met with the father once.142 They directed the father to find a job and stable housing.143 
However, the father had expressed that it was difficult for him to find employment because he 
did not have enough experience.144 The father had secured a temporary job through an 
employment agency, but it did not pay him enough to secure housing.145 The Department also 
did not provide the father with housing assistance.146 The Department explained their failure to 
provide housing assistance was due to the father not being gainfully employed.147 The state soon 
petitioned for termination pursuant to the 15/22-months rule, claiming that the child was in foster 
 
137 In re: K.S., 561 S.W.3d 399, 406 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (Judgment will be affirmed “unless there is no substantial 
evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence, or it erroneously declares or applies the  law. The 
judgment will be reversed only if [the court is] left with a firm belief that the order is wrong.”). 
138 L.B., 835 So.2d at 1195. 
139 E.g., In re: Elizabeth D., 888 A.2d 281, 283 (Me. 2006); In re: D.P., 510 A.2d 967, 971 (Vt. 1986).  
140 In re: T.W., 135 N.E.3d 607, 618 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019). 
141 James G., 943 A.2d at 82. 
142 Id. at 57. 
143 Id. 






care for too long.148 The lower court made no finding that the father was an unfit parent.149 In 
fact, one caseworker at the contested hearing admitted that “if not for the [lack of more stable 
employment and housing],” they would have reunified the father with the child.150  
The James G. court held that “the passage of 22 months is not, standing alone, a 
sufficient justification for abridgement of parental rights” when the state did not engage in 
reasonable efforts.151 The court found the state only sent the father one job referral to a job he 
was not qualified for.152 The court found that although the father did not follow up with the state, 
the state took no further action to help the father find employment.153 Further, the court found the 
father never rejected the little help he did receive.154 The court held that “reasonable efforts” 
implicitly required the state to offer services that address “both the root causes [for removal] and 
the effect of the problem.”155 In reversing the termination of parental rights order, the court 
stated that “the passage of time is not a substitute for reasonable efforts.”156 
In In re T.W., an Indiana appellate court found that the state did not engage in reasonable 
efforts to reunify the family.157 The father had been incarcerated when the child was born.158 
Once released, he went to the Department and requested help establishing paternity and 
obtaining a substance abuse evaluation.159 The father indicated he did not understand how to 
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comply with services.160 He also explained he did not have stable housing.161 The caseworker 
promised to help him find a job, housing, and to set up visitation.162 However, he made no 
referral to the father for a parent aide.163 The father retrieved and filled out the necessary 
paternity paperwork, but mistakenly returned it to the Department for the caseworker to file.164 
Instead of contacting the father to correct the mistake, the caseworker allowed two weeks to pass 
and put the papers in his file.165 The caseworker admitted at the hearing that “at that point, [he 
decided] the child was better off with someone else” because the father failed to retrieve the 
papers.166 The caseworker also mailed referral papers for drug screening to an initial address the 
father provided, but the father had since moved.167 The caseworker also unilaterally cancelled the 
visitation he set up for the father.168  
In reversing the termination of parental rights, the T.W. court held that although the 
Indiana state statute did not explicitly require state agencies to provide families with services 
prior to petitioning for termination of parental rights, unless an exception applied, the state had 
an obligation to make reasonable efforts to reunify parents and children.169 The court found the 
state failed to engage in reasonable efforts where they took no action concerning the paternity 
paperwork of the father, mailed a referral for drug screens to an address listed for the father even 











169 Id. at 613-15. 
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parent aide.170 The court stated that the “father [was] entitled to try and become a safe and 
appropriate parent to [the child], and [the Department was] required to help him do so.”171 
Even when parents are receiving some help from the state, the help they receive may not 
be enough to overcome the challenges poverty presents.172 The Court of Special Appeals in 
Maryland addressed the issue of “poverty alone cases” in its 2007 decision vacating and 
remanding an order of termination of parental rights.173 In Rashawn H., the court held that 
conditions like poverty or homelessness alone would not justify the termination of parental 
rights.174 The subject children were adjudicated children in need due to lack of a permanent 
residence.175 The mother suffered from lifelong poverty and was intellectually disabled.176 The 
service plan required the mother to find stable employment and housing.177  The mother was able 
to secure an apartment, but, according to the state, the apartment was not large enough to 
accommodate her and the children.178 The mother was ineligible for most government housing 
programs due to her scattered employment history and her history of evictions due to drug-
dealing.179 Despite the efforts of the mother, the state was unsatisfied and petitioned for 
termination of parental rights.180  
 
170 Id. at 615-18. 
171 Id. at 618. 
172 Martin Guggenheim, Somebody's Children: Sustaining the Family's Place in Child Welfare Policy , 113 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1716, 1738 (2000) (reviewing Elizabeth Bartholet, Nobody's Children: Abuse and Neglect, Foster Drift, and 
the Adoption Alternative (1999).) (Arguing that it is “essential that we determine the extent to which [poverty] is 
caused by factors for which we hold the larger society accountable and, therefore, could improve or eliminate.”). 
173 In re: Adoption/Guardianship of Rashawn H., 937 A.2d 177 (Md. Ct. App. 2007). 
174 Id. at 191. 
175 Id. at 192. 
176 Id. at 180. 
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178 Id. at 183. 
179 Id. 
180 Id. at 185. 
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The Rashawn H. court acknowledged that while that statute did not require the state to 
“bring the family out of poverty,” it also did not permit the state to ignore reasonable efforts and 
“leave parents in need adrift and then take their children away.”181 The court held the state “must 
provide reasonable assistance in helping parents.”182 The court vacated and remanded the order 
for two reasons.183 First, the court found the state made no showing that termination was in the 
best interest of the children because they presented insufficient evidence as to why the state was 
better suited than the mother to care for the children.184 Second, the court found the lower court 
erred when it made a finding that the mother “did a pretty good job” at maintaining contact with 
the state and complying with her case plan, yet ruled that “her efforts were insufficient” to keep 
the children safe and healthy.185 
The Rashawn H. decision can be contrasted with a decision from the Michigan Supreme 
Court seven years earlier ruling differently.186 In In re Trejo, the struggling mother had turned to 
the state for help housing her children until she could find suitable housing.187 The children were 
placed in foster care while she worked to find an apartment.188 The state, however, provided no 
assistance beyond giving the mother a list of low-income housing options.189 The state initiated 
termination of parent rights proceedings based on two grounds: (1) that the children had been in 
foster care for more than 182 days and (2) that the mother had failed to provide for her children 
and there was no reasonable expectation she would be able to within a reasonable time.190 The 
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lower court granted the petition for termination.191 The Michigan Supreme Court held that there 
was no error in the lower court finding that the mother could not rectify her housing situation 
within a reasonable time period.192  
The decision of the Trejo court was incongruent with the actual efforts of the mother 
prior to termination. The mother was required to find a two- or three-bedroom apartment within 
the time period.193 The record showed that the mother had moved frequently but had been trying 
to secure housing.194 The mother had secured two appropriate apartments, but lost them because 
she did not have enough money.195 In fact, on the day of the termination of parental rights 
proceedings, the mother had been on a waiting list for a two-bedroom apartment.196 The court 
placed the onus of finding housing solely on the mother with virtually no help from the agency to 
which she had turned for help.197 This furthers a system where impoverished parents have 
nowhere else to go for help, relying on the same people who are literally working against 
them.198 
In In re Aaron D., the Supreme Court of Nebraska reversed an order for the termination 
of parental rights and held that termination based on the 15/22-months rule was inappropriate 
where the actions of the state created impediments to reunification.199 The mother was an 
immigrant from Mexico and did not speak English.200 She had multiple children, including a 
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child with special needs.201 The State had removed her nine-year-old son from her following an 
incident where he touched his younger sister inappropriately.202 The case plan required the 
mother to find safe housing, stable employment, and to parent her children appropriately.203 
However, the caseworker only provided the mother with a case plan in English.204 The mother 
learned what the requirements were after finding someone to translate the case plan for her.205 
The mother struggled to find housing because she had been evicted twice from her home.206 The 
mother also struggled to find stable employment because of her immigration status.207 At the 
time of the hearing, the mother was paying for rent, bills, and groceries by using government 
assistance and “selling noodle and tamales” to people.208 The mother also inconsistently saw the 
family support provider for parenting classes because the location was far away and she had no 
driver’s license and no transportation.209 When she did attend sessions with the provider, she 
actively participated and successfully completed all the assignments.210 The mother was also 
unable to consistently visit the child because the child was placed in a foster home far away.211 
She could not travel because she gave birth to a new child and was the sole caregiver for her 
other children.212 When the mother visited with the child, the support worker prohibited her from 
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The state initiated termination of parental rights proceedings based on the 15/22-months 
rule.214 The trial court terminated the parental rights of the mother.215 In reversing the order, the 
Aaron D. court found termination was not warranted because the record showed the mother had 
complied with some of the requirements of the case plan, but that “her opportunit ies for 
compliance may have been limited.”216 The court found that the state could not show that 
termination was warranted “by implementing an unreasonable [case] plan.”217 The court noted 
that the difficulties the mother faced in finding a job, housing, and  attending visitation were due 
to issues beyond her control.218 The court found that the visitation schedule was destined to fail 
“not necessarily because [the mother] was unfit, but because she was poor and the child was 
located too far away.”219 The court found that although some of the challenges the mother faced 
were self-inflicted, other challenges “were placed in her path by the department and other 
circumstances.”220 
Courts have found that the state did not engage in reasonable efforts where they had not 
provided the parent with quality substance abuse treatment and placed the responsibility on the 
parent to find their own treatment.221 In In re Children of T.R., the state petitioned to terminate 
the parental rights of the father on 15/22-months rule grounds.222 The parental rights of the father 
were terminated after the lower court found that due to his substance abuse, he was unfit to 
parent the child and reasonable efforts to remedy the situation in time were futile.223 On appeal, 
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the court agreed with the father that “merely testing a parent for chemical use” does not 
constitute reasonable efforts to remedy substance abuse.224 The court held that substance abuse 
alone is not a grounds for parental unfitness.225 The court stated that the state must prove that the 
nature of the substance abuse renders the parent unable to care for the child.226  
In reversing the termination of parental rights order, the T.R. court found that the state 
was aware of the severity of the substance abuse of father, yet opted not to offer him inpatient 
treatment.227 The court also found that it was unreasonable for the state to recommend to the 
father that he “simply abstain from drugs and alcohol.”228 The court found the state also offered 
the father no psychological help as to assist him in understanding the true nature of the 
proceedings against him.229 The court stated that the although the father had been amenable and 
willing to comply with the case plan, the conduct of the state clearly demonstrated that they 
never intended to place the child with the father in the first place.230 
Courts have found that a state has failed to engage in reasonable efforts when they do not 
tailor the case plan to the specific needs of the parent.231 In In re S.J., the Washington Court of 
Appeals reversed an order for termination of parental rights because the state failed to engage in 
reasonable efforts and found that their failure resulted in the termination.232 The court found that 
the state failed to offer the mother the necessary mental health services she needed to continue 
her bond with the child.233 The court found that the mother had cured most of the deficiencies 
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that warranted state intervention.234 The state required the mother to find employment and safe 
housing and to undergo parenting classes, and psychiatric and substance abuse treatment.235 The 
mother completed drug treatment, enrolled in school, found a job, established an appropriate 
home for the children, and attended parenting classes.236  
However, the S.J. court found that state did not order a psychological evaluation for the 
mother until after she completed drug treatment, pursuant to court order.237 Further, the state did 
not provide bonding-and-attachment services for the mother during visits with her child.238 The 
mother needed the services to bond with the child because he was “a difficult child […] with 
significant behavior problems.”239 Without these services, the mother was unable to show that 
she and the child were still bonded, which is an integral part of the reunification efforts of a 
parent.240 This is evidenced in the findings of fact made by the trial court, which stated that the 
mother “had failed to repair her relationship with [the child]” and “was unlikely to be able to 
perceive and cope with [the behavior of the child] in the near future.”241 In reversing the order 
for termination, the court held the state was at fault for not providing the necessary bonding 
attachment services and mental health counseling to satisfactorily complete her case plan, thus 
violating her due process rights.242 
Even in cases where the court found the state had engaged in reasonable efforts, the 
efforts were arguably not enough to reunify the family.243 In H.B., the court reversed an order 
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terminating the parental rights of the mother because the state did not prove that the child could 
not be safely returned home to the mother.244 The state removed the child from the home because 
the home was unsanitary.245 The home had “no running water or electricity” and  was covered in 
“trash, cat waste, and bugs.”246 The mother explained that she could not afford to pay the electric 
and water bills because only the grandmother was employed.247 The mother was also struggling 
with mental health issues.248 After removing the child, the Department instructed the mother to 
undergo psychiatric treatment, attend parenting classes, and to work with in-home services.249 
The mother worked with the in-home services and underwent the psychological evaluation and 
treatment.250 The grandmother paid to restore the electricity and water in the home.251 The state 
moved to terminate the parental rights of the mother.252 The state alleged that the mother failed 
to resolve the issues that warranted intervention.253  
In granting the petition for termination of parental rights, the trial court found that the 
Department made reasonable efforts to reunify the family by offering her services.254 On appeal, 
the mother argued that the department did not engage in reasonable efforts because they did not 
offer to help to restore the electricity and water in the home.255 The H.B. court found that the 
mother was correct to point out that the Department did not help her restore the utilities.256 
However, the court affirmed the trial court, finding that the Department engaged in reasonable 
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efforts by “schedul[ing] classes and in-home services to improve the mother’s housekeeping 
abilities,” which according to the court, were “the main obstacle to family reunification.”257 The 
court reversed the termination order because the mother had resolved most of the issues that 
caused the removal.258 The home was no longer unsanitary and was safe for the child to return.259 
The court found termination was unnecessary where the mother may not be “a model 
homemaker,” but was otherwise a fit parent.260 
The H.B. court erred when it concluded that the Department engaged in reasonable 
efforts. The court stated that the housekeeping of the mother was the primary cause for 
removal.261 However, even if the mother had cleaned the entire home until it was spotless, the 
electric and water would have still been turned off. The court found that the department removed 
the child for “inadequate shelter” which included both the unsanitary condition of the house and 
the electric and water.262 The issue could have been resolved by the Department offering the 
mother the money to pay her utility bills. The cost of the utility bills is far outweighed by the 
psychological cost of removing the child from her mother. In fact, despite the unsanitary 
conditions of the apartment, the record contained no evidence that the child was harmed.263 To 
the contrary, the court found that the child was healthy, happy, and “had thrived under the care of 
the mother.”264 Instead of removing the child, the Department could have paid the utility bill, 
offered the classes to the mother, or offered to help the mother find employment or government 
assistance to pay the utility bills. Frankly, the Department could have just offered to help the 
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mother clean her home. Instead of admonishing the Department for removing the child for an 
issue that could have been resolved easily, the court affirmed that the Department could do the 
bare minimum when working to reunify families.  
These decisions only highlight the issues caused by the lack of a definition regarding 
“reasonable efforts.” Without a uniform definition, courts are given the discretion to engage in a 
case-by-case analysis where class and cultural biases will likely influence their decisions.265 
These decisions do not consider how difficult and time-consuming it is for parents to rectify the 
issues cited by state agencies. Parents engage in a juggling act when they are trying to complete 
substance abuse treatment, find housing, and continue their relationship with their child all at 
once. Further, despite the grand statements by courts that “substance abuse” or “poverty” alone 
will not justify the termination of parental rights, they place no responsibility upon state agencies 
beyond the bare minimum to help parents toward reunification. In many cases, once a parent 
appears in front of a judge, the damage has already been done. By then, the 15/22-months time 
period has run, and parents no longer have time to complete their case plans. When courts find 
that the state has engaged in reasonable efforts, they tend to skip issues that could have been 
remedied by the department, like cleaning up the home in H.B. and offering the necessary classes 
and substance abuse treatment in S.J. and T.R., respectively. Courts also tend to rush through 
issues that take significant time to resolve, like the mother searching for housing in Trejo and the 
father searching for work in James G. As Judge Justine Wise Polier emphasized in her 1968 
book, “the lack of appropriate services by the social agencies [has been] sanction[ed] and 
subsidized by court action.”266  
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Appellate courts cannot appreciate from the cold record the issues parents deal with while 
trying to comply with their case plans. This is especially true where state agencies present the 
actions they took to help the parent, but never clarify whether those actions were sufficient. Most 
parents involved with the child welfare system are poor, so appealing a termination order can be 
just as (if not more) time-consuming and expensive as working towards reunification. Parents 
must wait for an appellate court to hear their case and hopefully rule in their favor. Meanwhile, 
their children remain separated from their parents. Yet, as long as a state engages in what can 
best be characterized as token efforts, courts are likely to find that they have engaged in 
reasonable efforts. Without adequate guidance, courts across the country will continue to rule 
subjectively on whether a state has truly engaged in reasonable efforts and any hope parents had 
for reunification will mean nothing. 
III. Impact of the ASFA 15/22-months Rule on Families  
The timeline imposed by ASFA provides states with an avenue where they only need to 
engage in reasonable efforts for an arbitrary amount of time. Some opponents have called for the 
repeal of the 15/22-months rule.267 However, removing the time period itself would not solve the 
problems that the legislation was originally intended to fix. Removing the timeline would again 
leave children to languish in foster care for an indeterminate amount of time. Further, 
lengthening the time period would have the same effect.268 The best solution is not to attack the 
time period, but rather to attack the reasonable efforts portion of the legislation. Providing a clear 
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and substantive definition of reasonable efforts would ensure that state agencies provide quality 
services for family preservation. 
The impact both removal and foster care have on children is impossible to ignore. In 2019, 
over 672,000 children spent time in the foster care system.269 Children remain in foster care for a 
year and a half on average in the United States.270 Children have a right to the care and 
companionship of their natural families.271 Instead of this right being prioritized, it is subjugated 
to the interest of the state in freeing at-risk children for adoption.272 Children whose parents had 
their rights involuntarily terminated spend about a year and a half waiting to be adopted.273 As a 
result, many children suffer psychological damage as a result of being removed from their 
homes.274 While their parents are attempting to ameliorate issues, the emotional bond of the child 
to their family may be severely disrupted, through no fault of their own. 275 Children spend 
copious amounts of time in foster care, while their parents must meet the “middle-class” 
standards of often unhelpful state agencies. 276 
Parents are expected to turn their lives around dramatically when state agencies are involved 
with their families. Against the backdrop of the 15/22-months timeline imposed by ASFA, the 
expectations of state agencies are dissonant from the reality for many parents. Consider the 
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following example: a parent is tasked by a state agency to (1) find stable employment, (2) secure 
adequate housing, and (3) complete substance abuse treatment.  The average price for a two- or 
three-bedroom apartment nationally is between $1,800 to $2,000 per month, respectively.277 
These rent prices do not account for deposits, insurance, utilities, and other collateral expenses. 
For employment, many parents involved with the child welfare system may only qualify for 
minimum wage employment. The federal minimum wage in the United States has remained 
stagnant at only $7.25 per hour.278 Data has shown that as of 2020, full-time minimum wage 
workers cannot afford a two-bedroom apartment anywhere in the United States.279 To afford a 
two-bedroom apartment at fair market value, a minimum wage worker must work at least 97 
hours a week.280 If a family qualifies for Section 8, or government subsidized, housing, a person 
may spend months or even years on a waiting list.281 Meanwhile, substance abuse treatment 
depends on the nature and severity of the addiction of the parent. The National Institute for Drug 
Abuse notes that both inpatient and outpatient treatment should last at least 90 days.282 People 
who complete substance abuse treatment are forty to sixty percent likely to relapse before they 
fully recover.283 With all these different situations co-occurring, working toward reunification 
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becomes a seemingly insurmountable feat for some parents, especially before their child spends 
15 of the most recent 22 months in foster care.  
IV. The Current State of Federal Child Welfare Funding  
Whereas parents are not extended the grace of attempting to comply with their case plans, 
state agencies are often excused from their obligations due to massive caseloads and inadequate 
state funding.284 Funding for foster care and adoption is allocated through Title IV-E of the 
Social Security Act.285 Currently, almost five to six billion dollars is allocated to reimbursing 
states for foster care expenses.286 The United States Department of Health and Human Services 
(DHHS) has argued that allowing for unlimited spending in the area of foster care has not 
resulted in more positive outcomes, especially regarding preventative services (i.e. reunification 
efforts). DHHS found that if more money was allocated to preventative services to keep the child 
in the home, then the child welfare system would function more effectively.287 In total, the 
federal government spends almost ten times more on foster care than on reunification services.288 
A report found that in 2016, state and local governments spent $16.4 billion on child welfare 
services.289 The report found that while half of the funding was used for out-of-home placement 
options, only 16% of the funding was used for preventative services.290 In New Jersey, 92% of 
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federal funding in 2016 was spent on child protection and out-of-home placements, but only 6% 
on preventative services.291 The constant investment in foster care comes at a time where the 
nation is experiencing a foster parent shortage, where the demand for foster homes far outweighs 
the supply.292 
However, as with all federal funding, there are restraints. One report found that the 
limitations placed on how and how much of the funding is used has constrained many state 
agencies that may otherwise be willing to invest in preventative services.293 States are more 
likely to follow the directives of the federal government given that a little over fifty percent of 
their funding originates from  federal sources.294 States have used the majority of that funding 
not only on foster care, but also on maintaining their investigative capacity.295 Public outcry over 
stories of abuse and neglect and the alleged willful blindness of state agencies broadcast on the 
news only motivates the state to turn their funding away from reunification services and instead 
invest in yet another avenue of policing.296  
States are still better situated to shoulder the costs that are associated with investing in 
preventative services. Title IV-E waivers, called Child Welfare Waiver Demonstrations, provide 
states with the opportunity to apply for flexibility with their funding.297 The waivers are given for 
a five-year term and allow state agencies to be creative and redesign a variety of available 
services to improve their outcomes, such as the expansion of job training and parent-child 
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improvement programs.298 States that apply for a waiver would have the latitude to pursue a 
family-focused agenda, where foster care is a last resort instead of the first line of defense.  
The Trump administration recently passed legislation meant to change how funding for foster 
care is allocated. The Family First Prevention Services Act of 2018 (FFPSA) appropriates money 
for “time limited” services for twelve months to prevent children from being placed in foster 
care.299 In particular, the services should address mental health, substance abuse treatment (in 
response to the opioid crisis), and in-home parent skill-based programs.300 Under the FFPSA, 
cases that qualify involve children who would have been candidates for foster care.301 While 
advocates within the child welfare system have applauded the new law, the FFPSA shortens the 
amount of time families would receive preventative services.302 The FFPSA also does not divert 
children away from removal into state custody. The FFPSA also requires the services provided to 
meet certain requirements, which would likely require an (expensive) overhaul of current state 
programs.303 However, a bill titled the Family First Transition Act was subsequently passed to 
provide states with flexible funding to implement the initiatives of the FFPSA.304 Further, states 
are not required to participate in the program.305 
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The money allocated towards foster care and permanency efforts should be invested in 
reunification efforts. Some courts have held that “reasonable efforts” require that state agencies 
provide direct financial assistance in helping families.306 In 1990, the Supreme Court of Rhode 
Island rendered a pre-ASFA decision where it held that family courts can order state agencies to 
provide direct aid for housing assistance prior to filing a petition for termination of parental 
rights.307 The court stated that it is within the limits of “reasonable efforts” to require the state to 
assistance parents in cases where homelessness is the primary reason for removal.308 The court 
held that a family court may find reasonable efforts have not been made when the state has not 
provided the specific assistance necessary to resolve the issues that led to foster care.309 Further, 
in 1997, in Washington State Coalition for the Homeless, the court held that its dependency 
statute implicitly allowed the trial court to order the state to provide direct assistance in 
homelessness cases.310 The court stated that assistance should include (but is not limited to) 
offering transportation, assistance in finding housing, and waiving foster care payments to make 
funds available to provide that money to the family.311 In 2006, the Supreme Court of Louisiana 
reversed an order of termination of parental rights where the grounds were the failure of the 
mother to obtain suitable housing.312 The A.T. court found that while “reasonable efforts” under 
Louisiana law did not require the state to provide rent-free housing to parents, the statute did 
require the state to direct parents towards agencies that would help them find adequate 
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housing.313 The court found the state did not engage in reasonable efforts because the state made 
no effort to assist the mother in finding housing.314 These cases show that without an affirmative 
obligation being placed on states to focus on keeping families together, states will not necessarily 
engage in the kind of “reasonable efforts” that will ensure family reunification.  
V. Proposal – Defining “Reasonable Efforts”: “Conscious Efforts” 
In comparison with “reasonable efforts” under federal legislation, The Indian Child Welfare 
Act (ICWA) sets a much higher standard for “reasonable efforts.” Due to the importance of 
preserving the American Indian family, ICWA requires “active efforts” by the state to prevent 
breaking up an Indian family.315 “Active efforts” is not defined either, however, the state is often 
held to a much higher standard than it is in non-ICWA cases.316  For example, in In re E.P.F.L., 
“active efforts” was interpreted to mean a state must show it made active efforts to preserve the 
Indian family and was required to prove those efforts were unsuccessful.317 The court found the 
state had shown 21 instances where it engaged in active efforts.318 While the special protection 
afforded tribal connections provides a special justification for imposing a higher standard on 
state agencies involved with ICWA families versus non-ICWA families, it is imperative to use 
“active efforts” as a guidepost for how to raise the standard under ASFA. A definition for 
“reasonable efforts” under ASFA that falls between “active efforts” and “reasonable efforts” 
would better serve the goals of the state of protecting children and the rights of parents and 
children to the preservation of their families.  
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This Paper proposes that the definition for reasonable efforts under ASFA should be 
“conscious efforts.”  According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, “conscious” is defined as 
“done or acting with critical awareness” and “sharing the knowledge or awareness of an inward 
state or outward fact.”319 “Efforts” is defined as “a conscious exertion of power” and “a serious 
attempt.”320 Together, “conscious efforts” would mean that the state is required to make a serious 
attempt to assist families with their problems while remaining aware of the limitations and issues 
each family may face to meet their demands. A “conscious efforts” requirement would place an 
obligation on the state to provide families with more direct assistance instead of merely 
providing recommendations in a case plan. Replacing the word “reasonable” with the word 
“conscious” would push back on the judicial notion that “reasonable efforts” means “everything 
reasonable, not everything possible” because that statement presupposes that the current efforts 
in place are adequate.321 This proposed definition recognizes the financial limitations and 
availability of state resources, but does not allow these limitations to substitute for purposeful 
action on the part of the state to reunify families. More likely than not, state agencies can assume 
the costs of direct assistance.  
Taking the federal funds poured into foster care and requiring states to dedicate more of 
those funds towards direct housing assistance and other poverty-driven issues would result in 
more positive outcomes within the child welfare system.322  Parents are not infallible. However, 
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many parents suffer from drug addiction and mental health issues, while others are working poor 
or homeless, struggling to provide. As a result, many cannot satisfactorily complete their service 
plans prior to the 15/22-months timeline without more active agency assistance. The proposed 
definition would acknowledge that the parent is often making a serious and fair attempt, all while 
operating within a rigid socioeconomic system. Some parents may require more of a safety net 
from the state to ameliorate issues within the statutory frame under ASFA. More state support of 
families would allow parents to truly seek the help they need , especially parents who seek 
substance abuse treatment at the behest of the state. Child welfare does not exist in a vacuum. 
The proposed definition appreciates the reality that many parents struggle with issues wholly 
separate from their ability to parent.  
Redefining “reasonable efforts” to “conscious efforts” would also be truer to the 
constitutional mandate about the sanctity of the family. Termination of parental rights is not in 
the best interest of the child when the parent is facing issues that are beyond their control. In 
those cases, more support from the state would be the least restrictive alternative to termination 
of parental rights because it would refocus the inquiry as to whether the state made a serious 
attempt to keep the family together. Terminating the rights of a parent seeking substance abuse 
treatment or employment does not serve the best interest of the child. Terminating parental rights 
under these circumstances also does not serve the interest of the state in promoting the welfare of 
the child. Placing an affirmative obligation on the state to provide parents with the assistance 
they need to improve their lives promotes the well-being of the child. This proposed definition 
would also include allowing parents to have frequent contact with their children as they seek 
substance abuse treatment or stable housing and employment, so that these issues do not weaken 
familial bonds. Just as the Court stated in Santosky, “the parens patriae interest favors 
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preservation, not severance, of natural familial bonds.”323 When state intervention becomes 
necessary, the efforts of the state should be focused on supporting the family.  
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, “reasonable efforts” should be defined within federal legislation. The 
proposed definition should be “conscious efforts,” which is defined as requiring the state to make 
a serious attempt to assist families while remaining aware of the realities many families face. 
This definition would shift the child welfare system from a system that punishes families to one 
that supports them. Raising the bar on what constitutes “reasonable efforts” would re-orient 
states from prioritizing adoption to prioritizing family integrity. Without the current limitations 
attached to federal funding, states would be free to be more solution orientated, thus more 
willing to reinvest in family services and programs. With direct help such as more robust 
programs and direct cash assistance, parents will be given a fair opportunity to resolve cited 
issues prior to the 15/22-months timeline mandated by ASFA. This definition also recognizes 
that many parents experience complications that are environmental and not dispositional. No 
matter how complicated they may be, the focus of state agencies should be on helping the 
existing family of the child, not finding them a new one. 
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